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We investigated the infl uence of a mass poultry 
vaccination campaign on passive surveillance of highly 
pathogenic avian infl uenza subtype (H5N1) outbreaks 
among poultry in Egypt. Passive reporting dropped during 
the campaign, although probability of infection remained 
unchanged. Future poultry vaccination campaigns should 
consider this negative impact on reporting for adapting 
surveillance strategies.
Egypt reported its fi rst occurrence of highly pathogenic avian infl uenza (HPAI) virus subtype H5N1 in poultry 
on February 16, 2006 (1), and its fi rst case in a human 
on March 20, 2006. As of June 2011, Egypt was the 
country most affected by HPAI (H5N1) outside of Asia 
(2). Vaccination of domestic (backyard) and commercial 
poultry, which began in March 2006, and other measures 
were implemented to control the disease, but outbreaks 
among poultry and humans continued to be regularly 
reported from various districts located mainly in the delta 
region of the country (3). In July 2009, vaccination of 
domestic poultry was stopped (4). The objective of this study 
was to assess the effect of vaccination of domestic poultry 
on the passive reporting of HPAI (H5N1) cases among 
poultry. The completeness of the passive surveillance of 
poultry cases at the district level during and after the mass 
vaccination campaign was estimated by using a 4-source 
capture-recapture method (5).
The Study
Two periods were selected for study: period 1 
(December 2008–June 2009), during which mass 
vaccination of backyard poultry was ongoing, and 
period 2 (December 2009–June 2010), during which 
mass vaccination had ceased (Figure). Vaccination of 
commercial poultry in Egypt against avian infl uenza (AI) 
continued throughout the study period. In Egypt, the district 
level is the smallest administrative unit used for defi ning 
surveillance and control strategies related to HPAI (H5N1) 
among poultry. Thus, we used the district level to estimate 
the occurrence of HPAI (H5N1) during the 2 study periods.
HPAI (H5N1) circulation in poultry is recorded by 
the national surveillance of poultry coordinated by the 
General Organization for Veterinary Services (GOVS) 
in conjunction with the Central Laboratory for Quality 
Control of Poultry Production, based in Cairo. During the 
2 study periods, poultry surveillance was structured into 3 
distinct protocols: 1) passive surveillance reliant on disease 
reporting by farmers; 2) active surveillance of preslaughter 
poultry and high-risk areas (areas defi ned by GOVS as 
high risk based on specifi c criteria, such as the density of 
the poultry population and the detection of HPAI (H5N1) 
cases among humans and poultry in previous months); and 
3) the community based animal health outreach program, a 
participatory surveillance network that relies on traditional 
information networks to track down and confi rm HPAI 
(H5N1) events in areas where virus circulation is suspected.
The lists of cases collected through these complementary 
protocols by GOVS and the Central Laboratory for Quality 
Control of Poultry Production was provided by the 
Emergency Centre for Transboundary Animal Diseases 
Unit of the Food and Agriculture Organization in Egypt. 
Since 2006, the government has required the culling 
of poultry fl ocks in which cases of avian infl uenza were 
detected. As part of the initial program, government 
compensation for culled birds was also implemented, but 
because of misuse, the compensation program was stopped 
in 2007.
It is assumed that most human cases of infl uenza 
(H5N1) are linked to infections in poultry (3,6,7); thus, 
we postulated that a human case within a district revealed 
avian infl uenza (H5N1) virus circulation among poultry 
within that district. For methodological purposes, we 
hypothesized that a human could not get the infection from 
outside the district of residence. In Egypt, the protocol 
for surveillance of human infl uenza cases is based on 
reporting of suspected cases in district hospitals followed 
by confi rmation of infection by the Central Public Health 
Laboratory in Cairo and the US Naval Medical Research 
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Unit 3 (8). Data for human cases were obtained from the 
World Health Organization (www.who.int/csr/don/archive/
country/egy/en/). From this list of cases, 1 case from period 
2 was excluded because exposure to sick or dead poultry 
was not confi rmed.
Capture-recapture methods were introduced in the fi eld 
of ecology for estimating the size of wild populations and 
subsequently adapted to surveillance of infectious diseases 
in humans and animals (5,9,10). After accounting for the 
small sample sizes in our study (11), we used log-linear 
models to model cross-detection frequency data (Table 
1) (12). The best model was selected by using the Akaike 
information criterion and projected onto the “no detection” 
history to estimate the frequency of districts where the 
virus was circulating but not reported (5). Details about 
our method can be found in the Online Technical Appendix 
(wwwnc.cdc.gov/EID/pdfs/12-0616-Techapp.pdf). 
For period 1, the best model was the independent model 
that assumed no interaction between any of the 4 detection 
sources. For period 2, a signifi cant positive interaction 
(p<0.05) was detected between passive surveillance and 
participatory surveillance. The extent of the 2 outbreaks 
appeared similar at district level. The actual number of 
districts that reported infections in poultry was estimated 
to be ≈126 and 133, respectively, for period 1 and period 
2 (Table 2). As a consequence, the Figure suggests that 
surveillance was affected heavily by underreporting during 
period 1. The completeness of poultry surveillance at the 
district level increased, rising from 46% to 69% between 
the 2 periods. Moreover, the sensitivity of the passive 
surveillance among poultry during period 2 was estimated 
to be more than twice as high as during period 1.
During period 2, participatory surveillance targeted 
zones where HPAI (H5N1) virus circulation had been 
informally reported in poultry, potentially overlapping 
spontaneous reports and resulting in a direct positive 
dependence on passive surveillance. No positive 
dependence between surveillance of humans and active 
or participatory surveillance of poultry was detected, 
even though such dependence could have been predicted 
because of possible investigations into poultry cases after 
human cases were reported.
The assumption of no indirect dependence between the 
4 detection sources is the most critical aspect of this study. 
It is possible that all 4 sources had a higher probability of 
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Figure. Number of districts in which avian 
infl uenza (H5N1) virus infection was 
detected among poultry and humans during 
and after a campaign of mass vaccination 
of backyard poultry, Egypt, January 2008–
December 2010. Activity was identifi ed by 
active, passive, or participatory surveillance 
at the district level. Cessation of the 
vaccination campaign appeared to cause 
a large increase in the number of infected 
districts that were detected during Period 2. 
Shading indicates periods of study. HPAI, 
highly pathogenic avian infl uenza.
Table 1. Avian influenza vaccination and disease detection 
history of districts reporting highly pathogenic avian influenza 
(H5N1) in poultry and humans, Egypt* 
Detection history 
No. districts reporting 
infection
AS† PS‡ Part S§ SH¶ Period 1 Period 2 
1 0 0 0  13 6 
0 1 0 0  22 38 
0 0 1 0  4 5 
0 0 0 1  15 4 
1 1 0 0  3 7 
1 0 1 0  1 1 
1 0 0 1  7 1 
0 1 1 0  1 20 
0 1 0 1  2 3 
0 0 1 1  1 1 
1 1 1 0  1 2 
1 1 0 1  2 1 
1 0 1 1  0 0 
0 1 1 1  0 5 
1 1 1 1  1 2 
0 0 0 0  NK# NK 
*Columns1–4 describe detection of infection by various protocols: 1 = 
infection reported using protocol; 0 = no infection reported using protocol, 
e.g., the first line corresponds to the districts in which infection was 
detected only by the active surveillance of poultry. Period 1, Dec 2008–Jun 
2009; period 2, Dec 2009–Jun 2010. 
†Active surveillance of poultry. 
‡Passive surveillance of poultry. 
§Participatory surveillance of poultry. 
¶Surveillance in humans. 
#NK, not known. 
detecting districts with a high incidence of disease than 
a low incidence of disease. As a consequence, for each 
period, this positive indirect dependence is likely to result 
in underestimation of the true number of districts where 
HPAI (H5N1) virus was circulating in poultry (5), causing 
some districts that had few outbreaks to go uncounted. 
The consequence of such an underestimation is a slight 
overestimation of the completeness of each detection 
source. However, because this potential bias occurred 
for both periods, it should not infl uence the overall trend 
estimated between the 2 periods.
Conclusions
Our fi ndings support the hypothesis that mass avian 
infl uenza vaccination of domestic poultry may negatively 
affect passive surveillance for infl uenza infection among 
poultry (4). This phenomenon could be caused by changes 
in the clinical features of the disease linked to vaccination 
(e.g., lower mortality rate, fewer clinical signs). However, 
these changes should be considered negligible because 
of the limited effi cacy of this vaccination strategy in the 
fi eld (4). A disproportionate trust in the benefi ts of AI 
vaccination might be a more plausible explanation. This 
trust could lead to failure of the community to recognize the 
disease, based on the assumption that poultry vaccinated 
against HPAI (H5N1) could no longer be infected.
This study supports an updated interpretation of the 
evaluation of the HPAI (H5N1) control program in Egypt. 
We conclude that if reported outbreaks are the only data 
considered, the effectiveness of AI vaccination will be 
overestimated. Our fi ndings stress the critical importance 
of the quality of data used in the evaluation of animal and 
public health control programs and the necessity to evaluate 
reporting rates.
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Table 2. Estimated surveillance parameters for avian influenza virus infection in Egypt* 
Estimated parameters 
Period 1 Period 2 
Point estimates 95% CI Point estimates 95% CI 
Number of districts with infection among poultry 126 107–159 133 118–160 
Completeness of the 4 detection sources 0.58 0.46–0.68 0.72 0.60–0.81 
Completeness of surveillance among poultry 0.46 0.36–0.54 0.69 0.58–0.78 
Completeness of passive surveillance 0.25 0.20–0.30 0.59 0.49–0.66 
*Period 1, Dec 2008–Jun 2009; period 2, Dec 2009–Jun 2010. 
